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Abstract
The “affective turn” has been primarily concerned not with what affect is, but what it does. This article focuses on yet
another shift towards how affect gets organized, i.e., how it is produced, classified, and controlled. It proposes a genealog-
ical as well as a critical approach to the organization of affect and distinguishes between several “affect disposition(ing)
regimes”—meaning paradigms of how to interpret and manage affects, for e.g., encoding them as byproducts of demonic
possession, judging them in reference to a moralistic framework, or subsuming them under an industrial regime. Bernard
Stiegler’s concept of psychopower will be engaged at one point and expanded to include social media and affective tech-
nologies, especially Affective Computing. Finally, the industrialization and cybernetization of affect will be contrasted with
poststructuralist interpretations of affects as events.
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1. Introduction
The “affective turn” (Clough, 2007) has been primarily
concerned not with what affect is, but what it does. This
article will focus on yet another shift towards how af-
fect gets organized, meaning how it is produced, classi-
fied and controlled. But instead of starting with contem-
porary developments in the humanities like the widely
discussed approach to affects as non-human agencies
(as opposed to human-centric emotions), it proposes to
embed this contentious interpretation within a histori-
cal narrative in order to arrive at a better assessment of
what it tries to achieve. Therefore, it will not start with
the historically speaking very recent distinction of affect
and emotion but will deploy the term “affect” in a delib-
erately indeterminate way to refer to the upheavals of
humans’ bodies and minds which need to be dealt with
in oneway or another. Onemight think of the Greek term
“pathos” as the template for this use of “affect”; as is
widely known, the Latin “affectus” was one of the stan-
dard translations of “pathos” since Cicero’s time (Fitzger-
ald, 2008, pp. 3–5) and was only much later adopted into
modern European languages.
I will propose a genealogical approach to the orga-
nization of affect, which has at least two advantages.
Firstly, a genealogy is not a proper historical account,
which would be impossible to give with such a vast topic.
It can thus focus on general shifts and also remain rather
schematic. Secondly, the genre of a genealogical account
can be seen as a method of critique. Analyzing the writ-
ings of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, who fa-
mously established such an approach, the German polit-
ical theorist Martin Saar (2009) has identified three cen-
tral aspects of their respective genealogies. First, they
historicize the “self” or the “subject” and thus oppose
all theories that rely on essentialist conceptions; sec-
ondly, they describe this process of becoming a self as
a result of contingent effects of power dynamics; thirdly,
they present these processes in a certain narrative and
rhetorical way that involves drama, struggle, and antago-
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nism. A genealogical narrative is thus conceptualized as
an art of exaggeration. It aims to evoke an awareness of
the artificiality of ideas of the self and the world. Saar
speaks of an “affectivemobilization of doubt”with the ul-
timate goal of an existential upheaval thatmight even dis-
charge itself into a desire for transformation (Saar, 2007,
2009, p. 251).
The genealogy that will be proposed in the following
pages distinguishes between seven paradigms of affect
interpretation and organization, or, to use a tentative
phrase, of “affect disposition(ing)”. The term “disposi-
tion” can take on a more static or a more dynamic mean-
ing. Due to my emphasis on affect organization, I wish to
convey the dynamic side of dispositions as processes and
even as activities with the goal to arrange things in cer-
tain, deliberate ways. Therefore, to counter the risk that
“disposition” might be understood as a static state of af-
fairs (comparable to hexis in the philosophical tradition),
I choose to stress the processual aspect by using the
rather experimental expression “disposition(ing)”. The
reason for sticking with “disposition” altogether (instead
of just using “organization”, “deployment”, or “regula-
tion”) is its welcome (and clearly not coincidental) prox-
imity to the term “dispositif”, which has encompassed
the connotations of power, order, and contingency ever
since Foucault adopted it in his later writings.1
Whenever one of the paradigms of affect disposi-
tion(ing) becomes hegemonic during a certain period,
I will call it “affect disposition(ing) regime”. But even
when and if that happens, the older ones never disap-
pear. They can retain or regain their vigor by either in-
terlinking with more recent paradigms, or by opposing
them. Either way, the organization of affects has been
increasing in complexity throughout human history. The
fastest way to demonstrate this is by taking into account
all of the verbs that can be used to address this organiza-
tion: Affects can be called, invoked or summoned; they
can be generated or fabricated; they can be mastered,
controlled or extirpated; they can be caused or triggered;
one can immunize oneself against their onset; they can
be produced and boosted regardless of their valence or
quality; they can be modulated and optimized. Each of
these terms transports awhole subtext of ideas and prac-
tices, as shall now be demonstrated.
2. Classical Paradigms
The supposedly oldest affect disposition(ing) paradigm
interprets affects as by-products of being possessed by
a god, a demon or another nonhuman, but personal en-
tity.2 This might be both to the subject’s advantage as
well as disadvantage. Being possessed can empower a
subject to become super-humanly potent, or it can de-
vitalize it to such a degree that intervention by heal-
ers, shamans, or exorcists is called for (Dodds, 1951).
Homer’s Ilias is full of episodic possessions of humans
by gods, and even in classical times, the work of love
is being described by Plato as being effected by Eros,
who has at one time been called a god, and at other
times a demon in the neutral, pre-Christian sense of the
word (Plato, 1993). This paradigm of affect disposition
can thus be called the “demonological”. It involves cer-
tain practices of dealing with non-human entities, such
as prayers, invocations, summonings, or exorcisms, ex-
pulsions, and execrations—basically the whole range of
techniques that are thought to be effective in bringing
about either the approach or the retreat of a certain god,
demon, or angel.
It is exactly this involvement of techniques and thus
of human skills that gave birth to a very different under-
standing of where affects come from. If humans are able
to control the comings and goings of affects in the guise
of gods and demons, then the agency of affecting no
longer comes from these non-human entities, but from
the skillful practitioners. Affects can now be conceptual-
ized in a very different manner: as the outcomes of the
execution of skills by specialists who have been trained
in certain techniques, such as orators, musicians, actors,
playwrights, or writers. This paradigm can be called the
“poietological”, insofar as “poiesis” means the bringing-
about of something. In this paradigm, the focus lies in
creating affects in an audience for its own sake.We know
from the surviving writings of Aristotle, especially his
Rhetoric (Aristotle, 1991), how differentiated this poi-
etological knowledge was in the classical period. Also,
music theory and the discourse on theatre at that time
had reached a highly sophisticated level. Notwithstand-
ing their origins in religious or spiritual practices, these
arts had become more or less independent from these
enframements. If we believe Plato, practical knowledge
of bringing about emotions—these techniques, derived
from the Greek term téchne—had gained such a force
that master practitioners could basically mold their audi-
ences in whatever way they desired and thus threatened
to destabilize the political order.
Plato’s ethical and political thought reacted to this
development by juxtaposing arts and rhetoric with his
conception of philosophy (Plato, 2008). Regarded from
the angle of affect disposition(ing), philosophy can be de-
fined not just as a discipline of thought, but more funda-
mentally as a form or way of life—in the sense of Pierre
Hadot (1995) and Michel Foucault (1988)—that circles
around the question of howbest to regulate one’s affects.
Plato’s intervention centered on the concept of virtue.
It aims first to define what virtue is and then to live up
to that ideal standard. Affects now get reconceived as
phenomena that should be organized to meet that stan-
dard, which means that they are subordinated to ethics
1 In German, the same can be said of the term “Verfügung”: it encompasses command (by legal, military or other other ways of exerting authority), the
pure fact of possessing something (“verfügen über”), as well as the technical aspects of both commanding and possessing (via the verb “fügen”). In my
German-language research, I thus develop and use the term “Affektverfügung” for my genealogical approach.
2 This interpretation is partly inspired by Michaela Ott’s philosophical history of emotion, or what she more generally calls “affection” (Affizierung);
compare Ott (2010).
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and politics, as can be best seen in the discussions of
music and theatre in the political writings of both Plato
and Aristotle. The Greek term for virtue, arete, allows
this new paradigm of affect disposition to be referred
to as the “aretological”: its logic pertains to whatever
standard of virtues is being set. This can be shown by
the classical cardinal virtues: courage, temperance, pru-
dence, and justice (Pieper, 1965). Courage (or fortitude)
is the virtue of persevering through affects like fear and
suffering; temperance is the virtue of moderating all of
one’s feelings, thoughts, and actions. Prudence (or wis-
dom) is the virtue of knowing the ultimate ideal goal
of one’s actions, which is, of course, felicity or, as it is
more commonly known, happiness (the Greek term eu-
daimonia, being comprised of the prefix “eu” and the
noun “daimon”, refers back to the demonological regime
which now gets its aretological treatment). Justice is the
virtue of not overreaching in regard to money, goods,
fame, or honor and thus involves the tempering of one’s
desires. In Christianity, the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and charity have an even closer connection to af-
fects, as do the cardinal sins, which are basically emotion
terms that get a moralistic, if not repressive, treatment
(Brennan, 2004, pp. 98–101). Both in classical ethics and
in Christian moral theology, the responsibility now lies
solely with the subjects themselves. They have always to
be vigilant against the onset of carnal affects, of demons
who transfer their own affects onto whomever they pos-
sess, and of skillful practitionerswhowant to entertain or
amuse their audience in ways that contradict the moral
or religious standards. Once this aretological paradigm
becamehegemonic, it remained so until the Renaissance,
which facilitated a brief, but vigorous comeback of the
poietological paradigm (Meek & Sullivan, 2015).
3. Modern Paradigms
I would like to suggest that these three classical
paradigms of affect disposition(ing) suffice to describe
the organization of affect at least from a genealogical
point of view up until the beginning of the modern era.
The cultural accelerations that seem to define that pe-
riod are beingmirrored in regard to the question of affect
disposition(ing). Within the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th
centuries, four new regimes of affect disposition(ing)
emerged. The first is (unsurprisingly) connected to René
Descartes (1649/1989), who in his treatise The Passions
of the Soul maybe for the first time presented a strictly
mechanical theory of how affects are caused by cer-
tain movements in the body and especially in the brain.
Descartes’ mechanical thinking inspired a lot of Baroque
theories of affects, not just within philosophy, but also
in the arts and music theory. Actually, the so-called “doc-
trine of affects” (Affektenlehre) that circulated widely in
discourses of music, painting, and theatre and was used
in the composition of works of art, depends on Cartesian
mechanistic thought. In music, the idea was that a cer-
tain tune or triad could elicit a very specific affective re-
sponse (Pischner, 1963, p. 24f.). To be fair, recent schol-
arship has noted a conspicuous lack of definite concep-
tualizations of such mechanisms in the music theories
of the 17th and 18th centuries (Sparshott, 1998); it now
seems that the notion of an Affektenlehre, as alluded to
in the writings of Athanasius Kircher (1662/2006) or Jo-
hann Mattheson (1739/2008), was never really followed
up by a systematic scheme, apart from more or less
idiosyncratic suggestions by composers of what musi-
cal element has what effect on listeners. But of course,
Descartes was just one of many proponents of mech-
anism, a theory that gained prominence through the
writings of Galilei, Newton, Huygens and many others
and was also applied to the question of how to success-
fully elicit the desired affective states by actors, play-
wrights, and artists. The festivals of Louis XIV at Ver-
sailles, which became legendary not just for their splen-
dor, but also for their measured and controlled deploy-
ment of all known media of affect elicitation, can be
seen as an early epitome of the mechanization of affects
and the development of a “machinery of emotions” (Ko-
lesch, 2006). I, therefore, propose to call this new affect
disposition(ing) regime the “mechanological”: it defines
affects as being mechanically elicited in sequences of
cause-and-effect, regardless of sociocultural influences.
The mechanological paradigm thus tends to a reduction-
ism and to blend out social or cultural contexts. More-
over, the means of affect elicitation are thought to trans-
mit affective impulses more or less loss-free. The medial
aspect of the cause-and-effect sequence thus gets ne-
glected. The mechanological paradigm’s persistence can
be seen in the contemporary theory and practice of psy-
chopharmacology (Stein, 2008), but also in advertising,
inmuzak (the correct term forwhatmore often is deroga-
torily called “elevator music”; see Lanza, 2004), in the
social psychology of influence and persuasion (Levine,
2003) and so on—basically in all disciplines that deploy
cues for eliciting certain affects and view the respective
media simply as carriers for their transmission.
In the 18th century, affective mechanics gave rise
to an even subtler way of supposedly dealing with un-
wanted emotional states. It is centered on the term “in-
terests” that has now become an anthropological prin-
ciple, whereas before it had pertained to the financial
realm. The desire to gain more money, also called greed
(which of course is an aretological term, as it denotes
that desire as a vice), was now reconceived as a strong,
but calm passion (Hume) that should be regarded as a
perfectly natural “self-interest” (Hirschman, 1977/2013).
Moreover, it was said that following this self-interest
holds all the other passions, especially the more violent
ones, at bay, and that self-interest is not just natural, but
even rational in the sense that it can be calculated by
others. Thus, instead of fighting this affect, it was pro-
posed to follow its command; the promised advantages
were not just for individuals, but for society and human-
ity at large, and paved the way for the idea of the lib-
eral global market. The idea of not eradicating this af-
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fect, but using it to hold other, more dangerous affects at
bay, has striking similarities to the discovery of the tech-
nique of vaccination. During the 18th century, the prac-
tice of inoculation was imported to Britain and then the
rest of Europe from Turkey, where it had been used for
centuries (Bazin, 2003). Its success in fighting the small-
pox, one of the most dreaded diseases due to its high
number of casualties and disfigurement of survivors, led
to further experiments which at the end of the century
resulted in the discovery that using a serum from cows
affected with cowpox was the ideal solution, because
the cowpox-virus (called vaccinae) immunized humans
to the same extent that the smallpox-virus (called vario-
lae) did, but with much less risk. This immunization tech-
nique attracted attention from Michel Foucault (2009)
and Roberto Esposito (2011) in their respective writings
on biopolitics. The radical new idea was not to exclude
the danger but to include it in a controlled form. I want
to propose that this model of immunization was also
at work in the re-conception of the passion of greed as
a controllable self-interest. I would also hold that this
“immunological” affect disposition(ing) regime does not,
and never has worked in the intended way. But it was
successful in providing economic thought with an effec-
tive fundament, and with the contemporary global dom-
inance of neoliberal thought which is centered on ratio-
nal choice theory and the figure of the entrepreneurial
self (Bröckling, 2015) it continues to be operative, crises
notwithstanding (Pixley, 2012, pp. 54–63).3
Once the affects became rehabilitated in the Enlight-
enment era (the mechanological and the immunologi-
cal regimes did their best to weaken the aretological
paradigm), the path was cleared for an unhindered re-
lease of affections of every kind. With the 19th cen-
tury’s rise of industrial modes of production, it was only
a question of time until the production of affects was
fully underway. The emergence of mass media was in-
trinsically connected to a steep rise in the production
and distribution of affects, first via cheaply produced
newspapers. The question of affective quality was now
set aside by a focus on quantity. The more affects, the
better—this credo builds the basis for what later on was
called the “cultural industry”, a term that fittingly points
to the industrial subordination of traditional forms of af-
fect disposition(ing). In this new paradigm, which I call
the machinological, affects are understood as outputs of
a machinic system that need to be boosted. In contrast
to the mechanological paradigm, the machinological is
no longer based on the conception of closed systems
within which the sum of forces equals zero. Industrializa-
tion adds to themachinic the idea of an open system that
will always provide new forces. Cinema is the foremost
medium that executes this logic, with radio, television,
video games, and nowadays social media as its compan-
ions. The current social media debate points back to this
principle: the algorithms used by the platforms that are
criticized for their facilitation of hate speech, shit storms,
and fake news are designed to evoke asmany affectswith
as many people as possible. The overall effect of this dis-
position(ing) regime is agitation, if not outright addiction
(Alter, 2017). And agitation ends in depletion and exhaus-
tion if it is not countered by some other force.
4. Psychopower
Recently, the concept of cultural industry was updated
by philosopher of technology Bernard Stiegler, who in
his book Taking Care of Youth and the Generations linked
it to Foucault’s genealogy of power, which famously di-
agnosed the emergence of contemporary biopower. In
Stiegler’s view though, “biopower is no longer the force
of our age” (Stiegler, 2010, p. 126), because popula-
tions are increasingly being governed by the capturing of
their minds through marketing and entertainment tech-
nologies; Stiegler therefore also calls it economic psy-
chopower, basically understood as the domination of
people’s minds and souls by catching their attention and
inducing a never-ending chain of affects. As Stiegler con-
ceives this new form of power as being inherently a re-
lationship based on domination, the question is: Who
is in charge? Who executes this psychopower? Stiegler’s
answer is as simple as it is unsatisfactory. It is the “pro-
gramming industries”, which are basically the combina-
tion of the cultural industries of Horkheimer and Adorno
(2002) and the consciousness industry of Hans Magnus
Enzensberger (1974). Like the proponents of the Frank-
furt school, Stiegler does not take into account the spe-
cific relations that audiences have to those programs
that are being provided by those industries. It would
seem that cultural studies never existed. He would prob-
ably respond to that critique that whatever stance one
takes towards the programs of those industries, one is al-
ready caught inside the attentional and/or affective loop
that was specifically designed for that purpose. But this
argument only works if one affirms solely the machino-
logical disposition paradigm,which states that affects are
machinic outputs that need to be boosted, regardless
of their quality (and the same applies for attention). So
what Stiegler describes here is basically the pathology of
themachinological disposition regime, which leads in his
view to “uncontrollable societies of disaffected individ-
uals” (Stiegler, 2013), who are disaffected precisely be-
cause they are subjected to a never-ending stream of af-
fective and attentional modulation by the programming
industries following a capitalist logic.
As underdeveloped as this concept of psychopower
may be, it might still be useful when applied to the emer-
gence of affect-responsive media. Twenty years ago, Ros-
3 The rise of behavioral economics directly addresses the shortcomings of the rational choice model, as can be seen in Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008,
pp. 6–8) opposition of the idealized “Econs” or “economic men” and the more realistic conception of not always rationally acting “Humans”. With their
metaphor of “nudging”, they interestingly resort to a mechanological approach. The (supposedly) better-informed nudger nudges the lesser-informed
nudged in order to elicit in him the (supposedly) better behavior and decision-making.
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alind Picard (1997) published her seminal book Affective
Computing which gave a then still futuristic, but now
burgeoning, research discipline its lasting name. When
the Oxford Handbook of Affective Computing was pub-
lished a few years ago (Calvo, D’Mello, Gratch & Kap-
pas, 2015), it became visible how clearly Picard had out-
lined the road to make computers able to detect human
emotions as well as to simulate emotions for software
agents to induce affective reactions from their human
users (Yonck, 2017). Accordingly, Picard was invited by
the editors of the Oxford Handbook to recount her road
to establishing the research group on “Affective Comput-
ing” at the MIT and her development of the first steps in
theory as well as practice (Picard, 2015). The idea is to
close this loop of interaction so perfectly that there can
be a fully responsive emotional rapport, or affect attune-
ment, between humans and computer agents or robots.
The ways that human affects are quantified, categorized
and identified—in one word decoded—are for several
reasons questionable: for their reliance on contentious
psychological theories of basic emotions (Ekman, 1999),
for the supposed affective indexicality of the human face
and other physiological data, and for the negligence of
ambivalence, irony, and humor that so often accompany
or even constitute emotional expressions. But evenmore
contentious is the outsourcing of the faculty of affect reg-
ulation to automatic systems operating on hidden algo-
rithms. A new paradigm of affect disposition is emerging
by interpreting affects as information that is being used
for the modulation and optimization of psychical and so-
cial systems (Angerer & Bösel, 2016). Due to its depen-
dency on the cybernetic ideal of an autonomous system
of control, it can be called the cybernetological affect dis-
position(ing) regime. With the emerging technologies of
affect detection, mood tracking (Pritz, 2016), affect gen-
eration and synthesis, sentiment analysis (Ahmad, 2011),
psycho-informatics (Markowetz, Blaszkiewicz, Montag,
Switala, & Schlaepfer, 2014) and automated persuasion
(Stock, Guerini, & Pianesi, 2016), the concept of psy-
chopower is becoming more relevant. Future analysis of
how affect regulation changes with the implementation
of these affective media should, of course, not just look
into the technologies themselves, but how they become
integrated into habitual forms of affect regulation.
5. Eventology
Concluding this article, I would like to briefly point out a
parallel development in regard to the conception of af-
fects, one that is more or less directly opposed to the
cybernetic model of control. It originates in poststruc-
turalist and process-philosophical theories of the event.
Brian Massumi is probably the most outspoken theorist
who considers affects as events, thus pointing to their dis-
ruptive force (Massumi, 2002). Taken as events, affects
by definition cannot be controlled, even when humans
andhuman-made technologies try to capture andmaster
them. Something always escapes such attempts and con-
tinues to exert a force of its own. Affect is more than hu-
man minds or technical sensors can register and process.
By redirecting attention to this surplus force, Massumi
and others propose to acknowledge that there is always
some differentiating moment at work. One cannot be af-
fected the same way twice. At a very basic level, there
is always change and transformation, however slight or
negligible such a change may seem. This is also the rea-
son why Massumi puts so much stress on the difference
between presubjective affect and the subjective experi-
ence of an emotion:
Because affect concerns the movements of the body
it can’t be reduced to emotion. It is not subjective in
the sense of belonging to a subject to which the body
belongs….It is only on the level of emotion that this
subjective form of the affective event comes to be ex-
perienced as belonging to a subject separate from the
event. (Massumi, 2015c, p. 105)
This distinction between processual, bodily affect and its
capture in the form of a subjective, representable emo-
tion has been adopted by many of the theorists who fol-
low the affective turn. Massumi does not, however, as-
sume that affect is opposed to thought, as some com-
mentators seem to believe. On the contrary, thought for
Massumi is inseparable from affect, which involves “feel-
ing in thinking, and vice versa” (Massumi, 2015a, p. 91),
and inspires the term “affective thinking-feeling” (Mas-
sumi, 2015a, p. 94) as a way of saying that the unfold-
ing of an affective event in the body includes a men-
tal pole from the onset (Massumi, 2015a, p. 212). This
mental aspect of affective thinking-feeling is not just lo-
cated in the brain, nor does it necessarily imply reflective
thought. But it does involve spontaneity to a certain de-
gree on a level that precedes intentional and representa-
tional thinking (Massumi, 2015a, p. 181). All these ideas
are employed by Massumi to stress the novelty and cre-
ativity that each affective event implicates and that seem
to get lost, forgotten, or disavowed when affects get pre-
maturely identified as a certain emotion.
This conception also necessitates addressing power
very differently from Stiegler, who only regards it as
something that is exerted by humans.4 Poststructuralist
affect theory revolves around a non-human-centric ba-
sis: matter (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012). Events are
generated bymatter which forms the ontological basis in
these theories; they may, therefore, be dubbed “evento-
logical”. The conception of affects as events can likewise
be called the foundation of an eventological affect dispo-
sition(ing) regime, which acknowledges that affects can-
not simply or fully be controlled or produced, at least not
in a deterministic way. For Massumi, they can either be
indirectly occasioned by providing event-friendly circum-
4 Massumi recently proposed to dub this non-human-centric mode of power “ontopower”, as the “power through which being becomes” (Massumi,
2015b, p. 71).
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stances; or they can be modulated or “tweaked” once
they have begun to unfold: “It is the tweaking of an arc
of unfolding, on the fly. It is, therefore, more akin to the
deflection of inflection of a prescribed intention, or pre-
intended prescription” (Massumi, 2015a, p. 96).
6. Conclusion
With this reconception of affects as events, the ques-
tion of disposition(ing) reaches a turning point. Up un-
til now, the paradigm shifts always extended or claimed
to extend the power of disposition(ing). However, on
this occasion, with the emergence of eventology, dispo-
sitional power is decreased. It is as if the genealogy of
affect disposition(ing) now enters a phase of its own de-
composition, of its own deconstruction. Butwhether this
new eventological paradigm has the strength to ever be-
come hegemonic and thus to effectively antagonize the
cybernetological and machinological regimes, is a ques-
tion that cannot be answered at this point.
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